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How can a basic income be defended?
By Guillaume Allègre1
Following the submission of 125,000 signatures collected by organizations
(including BIEN Suisse2) supporting the establishment of a basic income, Swiss
citizens will vote in a referendum on a popular initiative to include the principle
of an unconditional basic income in the Swiss Federal Constitution. While a basic
income, which is defended by Vanderborght and Van Parijs (2005) under the
term “universal allocation”, can take many forms, its principles are that it is paid
(1) on a universal basis, in an equal amount to all3, without testing for means or
needs, (2) on an individual basis and not to households, and (3) unconditionally,
without requirement of any counterpart. It can be defended from both a liberal-
libertarian perspective as a replacement for existing benefits and social insurance
(with Friedman often cited in this sense, although his negative tax proposal is for
a family-based system; Capitalism and Freedom, p. 159), or from a progressive
standpoint, in which case the basic income would be added to most existing
benefits and social insurance. It is more in this second sense that the BIEN (2013)
advocates a basic income, although the liberal aspect of the measure is also
assumed: “It's the most liberal solidarity principle one can get, as it ensures indi-
vidual existence and social cohesion, without the rigidity of interventionism and
no oppressing bureaucracy.” A progressive version would add a fourth character-
istic: it must be (4) in an amount sufficient to cover basic needs and enable
participation in social life. The spectrum of advocates of a sufficient basic income
is very broad, and includes – under different names (universal allowance, subsis-
tence income, etc.) – those coming from the perspectives of Marxism, political
ecology (Gorz) and liberal egalitarianism (Van Parijs). The critics also represent a
1. Economist at the OFCE. Email: guillaume.allegre@sciencespo.fr. I would like to thank Sandrine
Levasseur, Maxime Parodi, Hélène Périvier, Evens Salies, Xavier Timbeau and the participants in the TEmPS
seminar organized by Jean-Luc Outin and Jean-Claude Barbier for their comments.
2. Basic Income Earth Network. The BIEN international network has its home office in the Catholic
University of Louvain. Its council is headed by Philippe Van Parijs. 
3. Citizens and adult permanent residents. It is also often proposed that a lower amount be paid to or on
behalf of minors, as a replacement for family allowances.
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Guillaume Allègrevariety of trends: Marxist, liberal-egalitarian (Rawls4) and social democratic
(Castel).
The features of a basic income differ from those of a guaranteed minimum
income, as it exists for example in France (“RSA-socle, former RMI”).  The guar-
anteed minimum income (1) is subject to means-testing, (2) is paid on a family
basis (household), (3) is conditioned on efforts at vocational and social integra-
tion. This conditionality can be considered weak in practice: it is monitored
unevenly around the country and sanctions are only rarely applied. Its level
reflects a trade-off between the goal of “ensuring its beneficiaries a suitable liveli-
hood” and the goal of “encouraging the exercise of a vocational activity”. In
practice the amount of social assistance is set not relative to the resources it
provides but relative to the minimum wage, as the report on the law establishing
a minimum income acknowledges5: “Given current conceptions of how income
and work are linked, it does not seem possible to avoid setting the RMI relative to
the minimum wage [“SMIC”].”6
This Note will discuss the fundamental principles underpinning a basic
income. It concludes that it is not easy to find a basis in terms of distributive
justice that is consistent with the four characteristics of a basic income. The
generalized reduction of working time seems to be a more sustainable political
solution than a basic income for achieving the ecological and emancipatory goals
that have been attributed to it.
What fundamental principles?
It is possible to distinguish four criteria for how economic resources are distrib-
uted. The first three are criteria set out by distributive justice (Forsé and Parodi,
2006): the principle of contribution (or merit), according to which each person
should receive their due; the principle of compensation, according to which
resources should be allocated according to need; and finally, equality. The
fourth criterion is intended to take efficiency into account: according to this prin-
ciple, resources should be allocated to those who use them best. 
Theoretically, a basic income can be justified by these four principles.
A basic income justified by contribution?
The contribution principle is widely used in social and labour struggles. These
struggles traditionally rely on the notion that workers are not really paid
according to their contribution to the creation of wealth. For example, from a
4. Rawls (1993) rejects the unconditionality of a basic income: “So those who surf all day off Malibu
must find a way to support themselves and would not be entitled to public funds.”
5. This was not the case of the single parent allowance (“API”), which in 1976 was set at an amount
close to the full-time minimum wage: at the time, it was not considered appropriate to encourage
mothers of young children to work.
6. Cited by L. Cytermann and C. Dindar (2008): ”Les grandes étapes de l’histoire du RMI”, in RMI, l’état
des lieux, La Découverte.2 briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014
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labour less than the value created and thereby derive a profit. Capitalist exploita-
tion thus expresses the fact that labour is not paid in proportion to its value
(which deviates from the principle of contribution). In a logic that they describe
as Marxist, Monnier and Vercellone (2007) justify a guaranteed social income by
the contribution principle: according to the authors, it must be “designed as a
primary income representing a counterpart for social work that is not currently
compensated, which implies a challenge to the still dominant reductionist under-
standing of the concept of productive labour”…. The authors emphasize that
there is a disconnect between work and employment, and that the former is also
a source of wealth, which should be remunerated. The authors may seem some-
what confused about the meaning of “a counterpart”, as they justify an
unconditional income (thus with no counterpart) as being the counterpart for
work. The trick is to assume that such work exists: “Indeed, the counterpart in
terms of work already exists. It is, on the contrary, its counterpart in terms of
income that is lacking.” The authors assume that each individual has already
performed social work that should be compensated. This kind of argument can
easily be turned against its advocates, as it could be argued instead that the
income already exists – in the form of income support, access to education and
health care – without any counterpart in terms of employment. The authors
could use a type of “second best” argument: individuals who do not perform any
social work are very few in number, and it would be too complicated or expen-
sive to try to identify them. But this line of argument would require defining
social work and producing evidence about the individuals who do or do not
perform it.
In any event it would seem difficult to justify an unconditional income in an
amount equal for all solely based on the principle of contribution.
Justified by need?
A basic Income could also be justified by the principle of compensation
(need). In its progressive version, it replaces a number of benefits that are gener-
ally justified by need and dignity, in particular income support (RMI, base RSA).
When François Mitterrand was a candidate for re-election, he argued in his Letter
to the French people for the implementation of an RMI-style income support as
follows: “The important thing is that a means of living or rather survival is guar-
anteed to those who have nothing, who can do nothing, who are nothing.”
Mitterrand thereby settled the debate at that time between proponents of the
introduction of a universal allocation and advocates of a minimum income.
Indeed, once the provision is justified by need (“a suitable means of existence”),
the characteristics seem to follow, including the fact that the amount depends on
family composition, insofar as this characteristic determines need. However, it is
widely accepted that economies of scale arise due to living together, which is
implicit in calculations of living standards: a couple has fewer needs than two
single people, as spouses share things that can be used collectively (housing,
automobile, household appliances). While an empirical assessment of these econ-
omies of scale is difficult, as is the way resources are actually shared by couples,briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014 3
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one-third more income than a couple in order to achieve the same standard of
living. However, the studies relied on by these institutes assume that economies
of scale do not vary with income.7 As the issue of economies of scale can be
adjusted by taxation for those with the highest incomes, what matters here is the
existence of economies of scale at lower incomes, especially for those who do not
have any income other than a basic income. In other words, the question that
interests us is the following: does a couple with a monthly income of 1000
(1600) euros have a higher standard of living than a single person on 500 (800)
euros? The results of empirical studies on the relationship between economies of
scale and the level of income differ depending on the method used for the esti-
mation. Donaldson and Pendakur (1999) use the budgets of Canadian
households and conclude that economies of scale decrease with income. Koulo-
vatianos et al.8 on the other hand use subjective surveys and conclude that
economies of scale increase strongly with income. Those on low incomes do
nevertheless benefit from economies of scale.9 There is also the issue of the actual
sharing of resources within the household: Is the RSA benefit shared equitably
within the household? If not, then the concept of a household’s standard of
living does not have any real meaning and an individual benefit becomes rele-
vant. In France, most couples pool their resources, especially among those on
lower incomes: 72% of couples in the first standard of living quartile state that
they fully share their income (Ponthieux, 2012).
Whether households share resources and whether economies of scale for
people on low incomes exist are empirical questions. At present, it seems that
they do. If so, then the individualization of a basic income is not compatible with
a justification based exclusively on need, and the formula for the RSA benefit – in
which the amount paid per individual depends on the household composition –
seems justified.
Justifified by efficiency?
Efficiency can also be advanced to justify a basic income. This requires
defining efficiency in terms not of the maximization of commodity production,
but of the maximization of well-being, based on a utilitarian perspective along
the lines of Bentham. The idea is liberal, as follows: whereas everyone has their
own definition of the good life, the traditional welfare state seeks to cover needs
that it defines itself (in terms of housing, education, health, access to employ-
ment); an unconditional income makes it possible to avoid this paternalism10 and
is thus more efficient in terms of well-being. This argument, though seemingly
attractive, poses a problem. In practice, efficiency is not a principle of justice, and
7. And that resources within a household are shared in full.
8. Koulovatianos, Schröder and Schmidt: “On the Income Dependence of Equivalence Scales”, Journal of
Public Economics, Vol. 89.
9. Another question that arises concerns the importance of housing in economies of scale for people on
low-incomes. Indeed, if economies of scale derive exclusively from housing, it would be possible to
supplement basic income by generous housing allowances for single people.
10. Used here in the sense that needs are defined by someone other than the individual concerned.4 briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014
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on the maximization of overall well-being. Take the well-known example that is
often raised against Van Parijs of the “hippie surfer”11 who has few needs and
uses his basic income to surf all day in Malibu, Hawaii or elsewhere. For this indi-
vidual, the unconditional character of a basic income would be a blessing in
terms of well-being: no more administrative formalities or appointments with
social workers to whom he has to justify his lifestyle or his efforts at social integra-
tion. The rest of society would also save money because this type of social control
is expensive. Unconditionality would lead to a gain in terms of overall well-being,
since the gain for surfers would be very high and the loss for the rest of society
would ultimately be relatively low (thanks to savings on administration). But how
socially acceptable is this? Is it credible that the rest of society would agree to
fund hippy surfers at a sufficient level? On the contrary, it is likely that the socially
acceptable level of an unconditional income would be lower than that of an
income conditioned on efforts at social inclusion. The losers from uncondition-
ality would be first of all long-term unemployed people receiving income
support. From a Rawlsian perspective, in which the long-term unemployed are
the most disadvantaged group, this sacrifice would not be acceptable.
The problem of social acceptability is primarily an empirical issue, but the
burden of proof tends to lie on the side of progressive supporters of uncondition-
ality, as they make the sufficiency of the allowance the main demarcation
between a free market policy of dismantling the welfare state and a progressive
policy. 
In addition, from a conceptual point of view, a justification based on maxi-
mizing well-being poses well-known problems (underlined in particular by Pareto
and then Rawls): how can we measure and aggregate individual utilities? Is it
sufficient to assign monetary values to the individual utilities ??and then aggre-
gate them? Can one compare the welfare of differing individuals in this way?
Should we then give the same amount of basic income to both the thrifty and
the spendthrift?
Efficiency is not in fact a principle of justice but an instrument: greater effi-
ciency can of course make it possible to compensate the losers and thus to obtain
unanimous agreement (the principle of Pareto efficiency). But in the presence of
losers, it is unlikely that invoking efficiency (the fact that overall well-being is
greater) will convince the losers that the solution adopted is fair.
Justifified  by equal sharing ... of what resources?
Egalitarian distribution seems the best principle for justifying a basic income.
Contrary to the principles of contribution and compensation, it is a priori
11.  The expression comes from Van Parijs. He answered this objection, which was formulated by Rawls in
particular, in an article entitled, “Why Surfers Should Be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditional Basic
Income” (jstor link for subscribers). Note that he does not defend the hippie surfer with a utilitarian
argument but with the logic of greater Real Freedom for All. The surfer here is a metaphor for someone
who does not intend to contribute significantly to social institutions, whether economically, socially,
politically or culturally.briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014 5
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of equal distribution is rarely used in the sphere of social policy. The typical
example in the domestic sphere is that of inheritance12, which in France is over-
whelmingly divided among children into equal shares; an inheritance that
benefits one or more direct heirs to the detriment of others is rare, even within
the limits allowed by law (see Arrondel and Laferrère, 1992). In the social sphere,
equal distribution is generally restricted to situations where the physical integrity
of individuals is at stake, such as systems of rationing or systems for queuing13 for
access to a medical operation or an organ transfer.14 In addition to physical
integrity, equal distribution is generally accepted in the case of resources that
“felt from the sky”, where the contribution principle cannot apply (typical case of
inheritance) or where it is impossible to distinguish each person’s contribution
(sharing a surplus that is due to cooperation). For example, some advocates of a
basic income justify it by the common ownership of natural resources or the
technological heritage. It is therefore not surprising that one of the first states to
have set up some form of basic income was Alaska, whose Permanent Fund is a
form of universal allocation based on the State’s oil revenues. The problem is that
justification based on a commonly-held resource does not at all guarantee that
the allowance is adequate and stable: the Alaska Permanent Fund dividend for
the whole of 2013 was only 900 dollars, compared with more than 2000 dollars
in 2008 (APFC). In addition, for other types of natural resources as well as for the
technological heritage, the argument of equal sharing would point more towards
a global basic income, which is explicitly rejected by Van Parijs. Indeed, it is
doubtful whether a global basic income would be sufficient, particularly in the
developed countries, unless the level were differentiated by country, but this
would mean deviating from the principle of equal sharing in favour of justifica-
tion based on need.
To pursue what goals?
In addition to these fundamental principles, it is important to discuss the goals
of a basic income. Its objectives are often the same as those pursued by current
social welfare instruments or by existing public policies.
Managing the end of work?
A basic income is often presented (including by liberal egalitarians) as a way to
manage the end of work and the growth of unemployment15: there are already
too few jobs, and in the future robots will take over the few jobs that remain. The
fact of robots producing a large share of the social wealth would be a strong
12. Although it can be considered to belong to the private sphere, the generalization of egalitarian
inheritance is a product of legislation, having been imposed by the Civil Code in 1804.
13. A queue, like a random draw, is a form of egalitarian distribution when goods are indivisible.
14. In these latter cases, equality concerns only individuals with an identified need.
15. See Van Parijs, 1996: “De la trappe au socle, l’allocation universelle contre le chômage”, Revue du
Mauss, no. 7.6 briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014
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important legacy from the past, so sharing this legacy equally would be espe-
cially justified.
While awaiting that utopian future, work remains an indispensable comple-
ment to machines: our societies are very far from a post-work future, and we
also have good reason to believe that productivity gains will be lower in the 21st
century than they were in the 20th century, mainly because of the scarcity of
raw materials & cheap energy source: it might then be necessary to work more,
not less16.
Even if productivity gains remain high and the reduction of working time is
desirable, it is doubtful that the introduction of a sufficiently high basic income is
the fairest and most sustainable way to reduce working time (so long as it is still
essential for the creation of wealth). The generalized reduction of working hours
– through a decrease in the duration of pension contributions, a reduction of
legal work week hours, an increase in the annual period of paid leave, longer
parental leave, or, why not, the right to a paid sabbatical leave – seems more
equitable and politically sustainable than a situation where some would benefit
from a basic income for life while others finance it by working. Indeed, intro-
ducing a basic income does not produce a homogeneous reduction in working
time, since the incentive to reduce one's working time would be much greater
for individuals on lower wages. This is a significant difference with laws on paid
leave and laws on the reduction of the work week: the latter have also affected
middle class workers, a situation which, it seems, makes for broader social
acceptability.
For Van Parijs, circumstances in which some would work to finance a basic
income for life for others who choose not to contribute (his metaphorical surfers)
is not unfair in so far as, if a basic income is set, anyone can choose not to work
and receive the basic income: people who choose to carry on working would do
so because they prefer to work rather than to surf all day, so they do not have
any legitimate reason to complain (he uses the envy test proposed by Dworkin as
a criterion for the fair distribution of resources). Maybe this would be true if we
ever reached this situation, but would we ever reach it with this type of logic?
The reduction of working time following the introduction of a sufficiently high
basic income would not just affect those on very low wages. It is conceivable that
some higher-wage earners would also be encouraged to temporarily stop
working, in particular to take care of young children. In this respect the basic
income would replace parental leave. In current social conditions, it is over-
whelmingly women who stop working to care for young children; contrary to
what could be done by reforming parental leave (see Hélène Périvier, 2013), a
basic income does not encourage greater gender equality by trying to balance
parenting responsibilities within the couple. This highlights that even in its
progressive version the philosophy underlying a basic income is anti-state. The
16. For a critique of the end-of-work thesis, also see Clerc and Méda, 2009: “Emploi et travail chez André
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social objectives (e.g. gender equality) by modifying individual incentives. As
with Hayek, by seeking to pursue social objectives the welfare state becomes
either lost amidst complexity or the hostage of political calculations17.
Managing the transition to the knowledge economy?
For political ecologists and Marxists, a basic income would make it possible to
adapt to the changing nature of work at a time when “intelligence and the imag-
ination ... are becoming the main productive force” (Gorz, 2002). Indeed, the
knowledge economy is changing the nature of productive labour and is
increasing the time required for training and preparation, which is usually
conducted outside working hours18. This justifies finding ways to finance this
time (e.g. by systems of intermittent work or continuing training) and instru-
ments to internalize the positive externalities associated with the production and
transmission of knowledge. However, the fact that knowledge is produced
outside the hours of employment does not justify delinking employment from
job income, since there is a strong complementarity between training and
employment. It is true that professors, artists, child minders, researchers, and
physicians train outside working hours and therefore that much of the wealth
produced results from time outside employment. Nevertheless, this preparatory
work is only fully productive in so far as the professors give courses, the artists
perform, the child minders look after children, the researchers communicate, and
the physicians treat their patients.
The knowledge economy complicates the set of incentives needed in order to
optimize the social contribution of each person, but it does not make it possible
to bypass the incentives created by employment.
Improving working conditions?
According to its advocates, a sufficiently high base income would lead to
improving the bargaining power of workers and thus their working conditions, as
they could refuse really bad jobs. In economic terms, a basic income would
increase the reservation wage for low earners and thus boost low wages (while
reducing the labour supply). There is therefore a threefold cost for high earners,
depending on the amount of the basic income: they must finance the basic
income itself, and eventually the decline in labour supply will decline and the rise
in low wages. The fact that low earners refuse jobs they consider unfit and that
low wages rise are obviously desired results of introducing a basic income. This is
the consequence of greater equality of resources, and thus of a more favourable
bargaining power for the most disadvantaged, which is desirable from an egali-
17. Some Marxists might also identify with this critique of the state, as is pointed out by Gazier (1988).
18. “Cognitive work consists of the combination ... of intellectual activity involving reflection and
communicating, sharing and developing knowledge, which takes place both upstream, outside of
production as well as in the course of direct, immediate productive work” (Monnier and Vercellone,
2007).8 briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014
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equal to the benefits for the worst-off. As the transfers required by a sufficiently
high basic income are potentially very large, it is essential that the foundations of
such a policy be sound.
In fact, the existing social welfare system has the same effects as a basic
income, with foundations that seem more solid. Social minima also have the
effect of increasing the reservation wage of low earners: with the RSA activité
benefit, the minimum social benefits are already combinable with earnings from
work, which helps to fight against trap effects (Allègre, 2011). If the goal is to lift
the reservation wage of low earners, the minimum social benefits could be
increased. As we have already seen, justification based on the guarantee of basic
needs (and hence the consequent family-based treatment) is widely accepted,
and conditionality (weak in practice) on vocational and social integration can
counter arguments about welfare dependency. Unemployment insurance also
improves the bargaining power of many workers, particularly the low skilled,
who are often victims of unemployment. It thus improves the distribution of
added value in favour of the less skilled. To promote equality, it is possible to
reduce the contribution periods to qualify for payouts, to extend payout periods
and to improve replacement rates.
Fighting against stigmatization and the lack of benefit take-up
While minimum social benefits may have the same effects on the bargaining
power of workers as a basic income, a universal unconditional income has the
advantage of not provoking unwarranted take-up or lack of take-up and does not
stigmatize the systems’ net beneficiaries. The issue of the lack of take-up of
minimum social benefits has however been growing in importance, especially
from the mid-1990s (Warin, 2012; Domingo and Pucci, 2012). This is due to
several factors, which are not necessarily mutually independent: lack of aware-
ness of the scheme, bureaucratic complexity, fear of stigma, concern about
intrusiveness, or a desire for autonomy. Lack of take-up poses the problem of
horizontal equity and equality in the face of the law. 
The public authorities must thus arbitrate between on the one hand benefits
that seek to meet the needs of potential beneficiaries, and thus are geared to the
beneficiaries’ characteristics, with the associated risks of complexity and lack of
take-up; and on the other hand, simple non-stigmatizing universal benefits that
are not as responsive to differences in need. In this trade-off, a basic income
represents an extreme solution, which can nevertheless be tempered if it does
not replace all the other welfare measures (housing benefits in particular).
Conversely, the conditionality of the RSA benefit could be eased. It might be
desirable to return to the spirit that led to the creation of the RMI minimum
income. From this perspective, the effort at integration is not regarded as a coun-
19. In particular by overestimating the positive externality of equality. If equality is truly better for
everyone, why aren’t societies more equal?briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014 9
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benefit may be suspended if it is found that there is no effort at integration.
A liberal pathway to exit capitalism?
Beyond the technical considerations, the utopian aspect of a basic income
should not be neglected: it is now brandished by some – Marxists, or political
ecologists – who want to move away from productivist capitalism. A basic
Income is thus the bearer of every kind of hope: freed from commercial work,
people can engage in activities that take on meaning in the context of commu-
nity associations.
It might be felt that this view overestimates the productivity of these associa-
tions and underestimates the power of the division of labour that the commercial
sector makes possible. From a Marxist or Illich-type perspective, the response
would presumably be that it is the counter-productivity of the division of labour
that is underestimated.20 Without entering into this debate, note that the growth
of the non-commercial sphere is probably more sustainable through the general
reduction of working time than through the introduction of a basic income. A
basic income runs the risk of dualization, or – worst – the balkanisation of
communities within society21   
Conclusion
While a basic income looks attractive, its principles are not very compatible
with the fundamental principles of contributory justice: unconditionality is
incompatible with the principle of contribution (merit), in the presence of econo-
mies of scale; individualization is incompatible with the principle of
compensation (need); and as long as work remains the main source of wealth
(until the advent of robots) the principle of equally sharing an exogenous
resource does not justify a sufficiently high basic income.
In these circumstances, the generalized reduction of working time seems to be
more sustainable than a basic income for achieving its ecological and emancipa-
tory goals.
Furthermore, so long as there exist economies of scale and a political trade-off
between conditionality and the level of minimum income, then in a Rawlsian
perspective a system of guaranteed minimum income like the French RMI / RSA
programmes (family-based with weak conditionality) seems preferable to a pure
basic income.
20. In a posthumous note, Castel opposes Gorz and Illich with respect to this counter-productivity, and
stresses that the “mass consumption” permitted by employed labour “represented a rather extraordinary
victory over the reign of scarcity, over the state of permanent insecurity that was the secular lot of the vast
majority of people.”
21. Dominique Meda (1996) also points out “the dangers of dualization, segmentation and balkanization
that such a system carries within itself”.10 briefing paper no. 7/February 3, 2014
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would be less stigmatizing. It would have to take into account the situation of a
couple and set conditions on social participation (which would exclude
“surfers”). It would involve checks on black market work and include incentives
to work. It would be supplemented by specific policies to provide support for
children, the elderly and disabled people, i.e. people who do not respond to
incentives, and it would complement the insurance system (unemployment,
retirement, illness). The social welfare system would thus not really be simplified
but transformed in such a way as to avoid stigmatization and the lack of take-up.
While a guaranteed basic income is not such a silly idea, nor is it the miracle
reform pictured by its advocates, i.e. a veritable Swiss Army knife - social, ecolog-
ical, emancipatingfor reforming social welfare.
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